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Concept and Unintended Consequences of 
Weather Index Insurance: The Case of Mexico
* 
 
Recently, Weather Index Insurance (WII) has received considerable attention as a tool to 
insure farmers against weather related risks, particularly in developing countries. Donor 
organizations, local governments, insurance companies, development economists as well as 
agricultural economists are discussing the costs and benefits of WII. While the literature on 
WII has mainly focused on many cases in Africa and Asia, in this article we analyze the WII 
program in Mexico, which is one of the largest WII programs worldwide. In this context we 
discuss potentially important spill-over effects on related markets which so far have not been 
considered in the academic literature. First, we argue that WII creates disincentives to invest 
in other non-insured crops leading to potential overspecialization and monoculture. Secondly, 
WII generates disincentives to invest in irrigation systems because farmers are insured only 
as long as production takes place on non-irrigated land. Third, in case of catastrophic events 
food prices can potentially inflate with indemnity payments at the expense of the uninsured 
poor. We also suggest that in Mexico the thresholds of the weather index be (continuously) 
re-calibrated in order to adjust for the development of drought resistant seeds. Finally, the 
index could relatively easily be extended to account for precipitation variances. We argue that 
these factors and spillover effects should be accounted for in cost benefit analysis of WII. 
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The productivity of agriculture is highly influenced by the conditions of the natural 
environment. In particular, changes in climatic and weather conditions impact farmers’ 
yields, and in developing countries—where a high percentage of the gross domestic 
product is generated by agricultural income—unfavorable conditions can severely affect 
the overall well-being of an entire region. Traditionally, farmers have developed several 
coping mechanisms to mitigate the potential negative impacts of their exposure to natural 
risks, namely by investments in: 
  crop diversification (planting multiple crops with different vulnerabilities to 
weather events),  
  irrigation systems (to decrease the farmers dependence on precipitation)  
  the generation of off-farm incomes  
  formal and informal banking systems (either by accumulating savings or access to 
credit markets).  
Today, despite the existence of these risk mitigating mechanisms, in developing countries 
a large portion of weather shocks’ negative effects are still not entirely absorbed, which 
in some cases can lead to humanitarian catastrophes such as famines or civil wars over 
access to important resources (Barnett and Mahul 2007, Alderman and Haque 2008). 
More generally, the lack of tools to insure sectors against weather shocks has led to an 
underinvestment in the agricultural sector (Rosenzweig and Binswanger 1993, Morduch 
1995).  3 
 
Historically, governments have used disaster relief funds to respond quickly and stabilize 
areas affected by floods or droughts. However, the volatility of disaster funds over 
time—and the associated strains on other governmental budgets, e.g., education or 
security, from which the resources are taken—pose difficulties. Furthermore, disaster 
relief is an “ex-post” strategy only. In recent years efforts increased at designing “ex-
ante” strategies. In theory, under the assumption of risk aversion, an optimally designed 
WII facilitates overcoming credit constraints, mitigates chronic underinvestment, 
increases productivity and could potentially relieve poor farmers from poverty traps as 
discussed in Barnett, Barrett and Skees (2008).  
Weather Index Insurance Literature and Challenges  
Although weather index insurance contracts are currently considered to be an effective 
tool for the agricultural sector in developing countries (i.e. Sakurai and Reardon 1997; 
Skees 1999 and 2000, Skees and Ayurzana 2002, Barnett and Mahul 2007, Barnett, 
Barrett and Skees 2008) the first successful implementation has been realized in the U.S. 
in 1997: after the deregulation of the energy sector, energy providers increasingly insured 
themselves against mild winters to compensate for potential loss of revenue due to the 
decreased use of energy for heating (Cao Li and Wei 2003). Since then, stakeholders in 
the sectors of tourism, agriculture, travel and event organization have engaged in the 
trading of weather derivatives which became a 40 billion dollar business for the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange alone in 2006 (Ginocchio 2008).  
The basic concept of WII is simple: if a certain measured weather index (i.e. 
precipitation) is above (flood) or below (drought) a pre-defined threshold, then the 4 
 
insurance pays indemnity payments to the insurance holder (farmer). While we will 
discuss the challenges of this mechanism in more detail below, the perceived advantages 
of WII are that it circumvents both moral hazard and adverse selection, which are 
problems in traditional insurance schemes that are based on actual losses of harvest. 
Furthermore, it is often argued (Barnett and Mahul 2007, Barnett, Barrett and Skees 
2008) that WII is cost effective because no harvest damage assessment has to be made.  
Regarding the economics and feasibility of the insurance program, important recent 
insights have been gained in the case of India, Malawi and China. The main empirical 
problem is the take-up rate by farmers purchasing WII, ranging (depending on the study) 
in 2004 from 4-5% as analyzed by Giné, Townsend and Vickery (2008) in India, to rates 
of about 27% for the same sample of Indian farmers in 2006 as analyzed by Cole et al 
(2008). These studies and a series of additional papers (Giné and Yang 2009, Cai et al. 
2009) analyze the determinants of participation of WII and find: the higher the 
correlation between the weather index and the yield (basis risk), the higher the take-up 
rate. Furthermore, take-up increases with household wealth and with less restrictive credit 
constraints. These results are consistent with the predictions of simple neoclassical 
models. The above studies however also point towards important social-psychological 
and peer-effect related determinants for take-up, namely trust in the insurance program, 
participation in village networks, and familiarity with the insurance vendors. These 
variables are consistently correlated with the take-up decision. Furthermore Giné, 
Townsend and Vickery (2008) performed experiments with farmers to measure their 
degree of risk aversion. The authors found—now contrary to the theoretical predictions 5 
 
from the neoclassical model—that risk averse farmers are less (not more) likely to 
participate in WII, which may reflect their uncertainty about the WII program itself.
 
In an already widely cited paper, Giné and Yang (2009) study the interaction between 
access to credit and access to WII, which is important given that one argument in favor of 
WII is that it helps farmers overcome credit constraints. Their findings, in randomized 
field experiments in Malawi, were that farmers who were offered credit were less likely 
to adopt the credit if simultaneously the farmer was also offered a WII (compared to the 
control group of farmers that were offered credit only). Giné and Yang interpret this 
result with limited liability of the loan contract: farmers already are implicitly insured by 
the limited liability inherent in the loan contract, so that bundling a loan with formal 
insurance (for which an insurance premium is charged) is effectively an increase in the 
interest rate on the loan (Giné and Yang 2009, p. 2). Another potential interpretation that 
Giné and Yang offer is of psychological nature, in the sense that by offering both credit 
and WII, farmers are reminded of the risk of defaulting the credit and hence decide to 
accept neither. Finally, an additional interpretation (not described in Giné and Yang) is 
that for the ‘average’ Malawi groundnut and maize farmer, the simultaneous offer of both 
credit and insurance is simply too complicated to understand. Hence farmers may decide 
to accept neither contract due to their uncertainty with the details of the various policies 
and the interaction of the policies in case of a default. Suggestive evidence for this 
hypothesis is supported by the fact that the adoption of both offers increases with 
education, income and wealth.
1 6 
 
Based on these experiences a debate has emerged whether WII is an efficient tool for 
developing countries and whether WII is self-sustainable. Due to the low take-up rates—
some donor organizations are now more hesitant to further invest resources into WII. For 
example, after a workshop on WII at the Headquarters of the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation in Seattle, the Foundation decided not to further support and engage in 
weather index insurance programs (Wolff 2010).  
However, the design of the Mexican insurance program differs from other WII programs 
in several important ways. Therefore, we think it is worth looking at in greater detail in 
order to have a better understanding of the potential role, costs and benefits and 
effectiveness of different WII design options. Below, we will examine some of the main 
problem areas of WII. Barnett and Mahul (2007) and Barnett, Barrett and Skees (2008) 
contributed papers which conceptually discuss the main challenges, which can be 
categorized into (i) basis risk (ii) low data quality, and (iii) low willingness to pay. We 
further discuss the problem of diversification, technology inertia, and other aggregate 
equilibrium effects.  
Weather Index Insurance in Mexico  
Agricultural Background  
Mexico’s WII is designed to insure against droughts in non-irrigated agricultural 
production. It covers four crops: maize, barley, beans and sorghum on a total of 1.9 
million hectares.  The insurance mainly targets maize: of the total 1.9 million hectares 
insured, 81% (1.5 million hectares) is devoted to maize. In Mexico, maize is the most 
important crop, and its relative dominance is even higher in non-irrigated agriculture: 7 
 
90% of all maize is grown on rain-fed land and the remaining 10% of all maize is grown 
on irrigated land.
2 
Eighty percent of all agricultural catastrophes in Mexico are caused by drought. This 
situation is exacerbated in El Niño phenomenon years. Federal and State Governments 
spent around a third of a billion U.S. dollars in disaster relief due to agricultural 
catastrophes between 1995 and 2003 (Ministry of Agriculture 2009). Moreover, access to 
private agricultural production insurance in Mexico is insufficient since land 
fragmentation (more than 60% of farmers own less than 5 hectares), large administrative 
costs and systemic risk discourage private insurers. Due to the lack of private insurers 
and the high budgeting uncertainty of disaster relief funds, the Mexican Government, 
through the Ministry of Agriculture, introduced the rainfall index insurance in 2003. The 
insurance’s objective is to efficiently support small-scale producers—defined as owning 
no more than 20 hectares—in the case of adverse droughts.  
Regional Enrollment versus Private Take-Up  
While in 2003 the insurance was only available in five counties, in 2008 the insurance 
covered over 656 counties with a total of 1.9 million hectares. In particular, every year 
since 2003 state level officials suggest to their federal counterpart the area to be insured 
(number of hectares and counties considered) within the first three months of the year and 
before the beginning of the season. The federal government pays 70% of the cost of the 
insurance premiums and state governments cover the remaining 30%. However, for 
counties that have high poverty levels (defined by the National Population Council), costs 
are split 90% to 10% between federal and state governments, respectively. In Mexico, 8 
 
“Agroasemex” a governmental agency formed in 2001, provides exclusive coverage. An 
important aspect of the WII in Mexico is that although it provides production insurance 
for small-scale farmers, Agroasemex essentially insures the federal government budgets. 
In other words, it serves as a budget risk management tool since it allows annual budget 
planning minimizing catastrophic ex-post expenditure due to droughts. Agroasemex itself 
reinsures their risk with the U.S. re-insurance company Partner RE, hence spreading the 
covariate risk on an international level. On the international level reinsurers can regard a 
country’s risk as an idiosyncratic risk if the reinsurer itself invests in multiple countries.  
Importantly, in Mexico individual producers do not pay premiums to obtain coverage 
under the WII. Instead, WII is jointly contracted by federal and state governments that 
provide resources from their annual budgets to purchase insurance premiums. The 
automatically insured farmers get informed about their coverage status through state 
officials.
3 However, whether this information channel is effective and farmers are truly 
aware of this insurance coverage is an open question. In order to evaluate the information 
channels, the Ministry of Agriculture hence requires that the program be externally 
evaluated. In particular, during the latest external evaluation of 2009 it was demanded 
that a subset of randomly selected farmers be surveyed to determine their awareness of 
and willingness to pay for the insurance. According to the Ministry of Agriculture (2009) 
this external evaluation proved that (i) almost 100% of the farmers know about the 
existence of the insurance, and (ii) over 80% of the farmers reveal a positive willingness 
to pay for the premium (in order to obtain the insurance in case the government would 
not provide it for free). However, it is important to point out that this study—although 9 
 
classified as external to the interests of the government—was contracted by the Mexican 
government and may not satisfy strict scientific criteria. In particular, the result that there 
exists a positive willingness to pay among Mexican farmers is in stark contrast to the 
results found by Giné, Townsend and Vickery (2008), Cole et. al. (2008) in India, Giné 
and Yang (2009) in Malawi 2008, and Cai et al. (2009) in China. Given the importance 
and academic interest of this issue, this problem should be analyzed further.   
Data Quality  
The Mexican WII program takes advantage of existing and publicly available weather 
data. Although there are more than five thousand weather stations in the country, 
Agroasemex only uses a subset since few of these stations attain international standards 
and have more than 25 years of daily weather information. The 25 year requirement was 
introduced because it was regarded important to obtain a long enough time series to 
statistically predict the rain-yield correlation pattern. 
Basis risk Modeling and the problem of non-moving thresholds 
“Basis risk” is often viewed as the most significant problem with WII design (basis risk 
describes how well the index is correlated with crop yields). To model the relationship 
between weather conditions and crop yields, the Mexican “Agricultural Insurance 
Simulation Model” was developed. This model is important as it is used to determine the 
critical threshold index values below which indemnity payments are triggered 
(Agroseamex 2006). The model consists of a system of equations representing the crop-
soil-weather relationship, taking into account the specifics of each agronomic climate 
region. As a result, the growing season is separated into three phases (seeding, flowering, 10 
 
harvest). Different thresholds are established for each of these three phases, for each crop 
and for each agro-climatic zone. The agro-climatic zones are referred to as Agro-Climatic 
Zone of Homogeneous Response (ACZHR). Indemnity payments are provided if rainfall 
is below the pre-established threshold, as measured in millimeters by weather stations in 
the ACZHR. As an example, we look at the case of a zone in the state of Guanajuato in 
figure 1 corresponding to the rainfall of the year 2005. Agroasemex offers the following 
contract for insuring maize in the county “Apaseo el Alto”. The first period, also known 
as the sowing period, runs from May 15 to July 5; the second period, or flowering period, 
from July 6 to August 20; and the third, or harvesting period, from August 21 to October 
31. The minimum amount of cumulative rain above which Agroasemex does not provide 
indemnity payments (known as the trigger threshold) equals 43, 80 and 60 millimeters for 
the first, second and third period, respectively.  As can be seen from figure 1, there were 
no indemnity payments in Apaseo el Alto, since cumulative rainfall was higher in each of 
the three periods than the minimum thresholds. Figure 2 shows the rainfall pattern for the 
county Leon in 2005. Indemnity payments were provided in 2005 for maize production in 
Leon since cumulative rainfall was lower than the sowing period minimum threshold.  
Given the importance of the thresholds for WII, in our opinion it is problematic that these 
thresholds stay constant over time. In Mexico, since the start of the program in 2003, the 
defined thresholds were not re-adjusted although currently a substantial amount of 
research has been devoted to the development of drought resistant corn and maize types 
(Ribaut et al. 2009). Non-moving thresholds can inhibit important incentives to invest in 11 
 
research and development of drought-resistant seeds. Hence we suggest a model re-
calibration and the consideration of appropriately moving thresholds over time. 
In addition, we consider that not only the minimum amount of cumulative rain in each 
period is important, but also its variance within that period. In other words, attaining the 
minimum amount of cumulative rainfall in one or two days (potential flood) has very 
different consequences on the growing conditions of maize compared to the same amount 
of cumulative rainfall dispersed over a larger number of days. Therefore, we suggest an 
additional index which counts the number of days with a positively measured rainfall 
minimum. If a minimum number of days of rainfall is not reached, then the indemnity 
payment is triggered.  
Risk of non-diversification: monoculture and inertia in technology  
In Mexico 22% of all rain-fed maize production is currently insured and it is intended 
that the program will be scaled up to the entire nation. In rolling out the program over 
larger regions, however, incentives to the farmers are lacking to diversify (i.e. into crops 
which are not insured) and so we see the risk of crop overspecialization. Maize 
monoculture has potential negative effects on the environment and long term 
sustainability (Berzsenyi 2000).  
More generally, a strong WII creates disincentives to invest in other important 
agricultural technologies. For example WII may decrease efforts to invest in the 
development of irrigation systems because farmers are insured only if crops are planted 
on rain-fed land. Irrigation, however, is widely accepted to be the main technology 
responsible for crop yield increases in arid areas, especially in developing countries. 12 
 
Similarly, due to the nationwide rollout of the WII the structure of the rural work-force 
can be affected by reducing off-farm income, which prior to the WII program was one of 
the major risk coping mechanisms in Mexico.  
Aggregate equilibrium effects of disaster prevention 
The Mexican WII program was initially designed by the government for budget planning 
purposes to produce an ex-ante disaster prevention strategy which has no volatility in 
budget size. There is considerable work on WII as a tool to prevent disasters and famines 
(Barnett, Barrett and Skees 2008, Chantarat et al. 2007). For a WII program with such 
large coverage as in Mexico, however, the problem is that under food shortages sudden 
indemnity payments can lead to rapid food price increases. This may be particularly true 
in rural areas, which are not well integrated into larger markets and where maize is a 
necessity with very low own price elasticity of demand. Households not covered under 
the WII would be especially vulnerable due to inflation (poor non-farming population or 
firms that produce other crops than those that are insured).
4 This perverse price effect is 
likely even more important in less developed countries and in WII programs that cover 
perishable commodities of life stock or vegetables.  
Conclusion 
In this paper we outline the rapidly growing Mexican weather index insurance program 
and discuss some associated challenges. In particular we suggest that the thresholds of the 
weather index be (continuously) re-calibrated in order to adjust for the development of 
drought resistant seeds. Secondly, the index could relatively easily be extended to 
account for precipitation variances. Thirdly we point out potential spill-over effects on 13 
 
related markets: WII creates disincentives to invest in other non-insured crops leading to 
potential overspecialization and monoculture. WII further generates disincentives to 
invest in irrigation systems because farmers are insured only as long as production takes 
place on non-irrigated land. Finally, in case of catastrophic events food prices can inflate 
with indemnity payments at the expense of the uninsured poor. Clearly further research is 
necessary, in order to evaluate the magnitude and the potential importance of these 
various side effects of WII. For preliminary results see Fuchs and Wolff (2010). 
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Endnotes 
                                                            
1 While writing this paper we got aware that Osgood (2010) offers an additional 
interpretation of the results by Giné and Yang. Farmers who are concerned about income 
thresholds might be more interested in production increases than risk reduction, and, 
consistent with the Malawi insurance implementation strategy, may value the insurance 
more for making credit possible than for risk reduction per se. 
2 In Mexico non-irrigated farming still clearly dominates. In 2008, agricultural production 
accounted for up to 20.5 million hectares of which 73.6% depended exclusively on rain. 
Maize production covered 7.8 million hectares of which more than 6.9 million (90%) was 
non-irrigated land (Ministry of Agriculture, 2009).   
3 The announcements are made through the regional offices of the Program for Direct 
Assistance in Agriculture or through the “Ventanillas Autorizadas” depending on plots 
location and county. 
4 In less developed African countries the effect of a local price increase may be even 
larger because a larger portion of the population directly depends on farm-income (and a 17 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
larger percentage of the population would be hence insured) and because the agricultural 
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Figure 2: weather insurance thresholds and actual rainfall: Leon, 2005